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1. INTRODUCTION
States have for many years struggled to include employers in their
health care reform efforts, in large part because the federal Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)1 preempts any state
law that relates to an employee benefit plan. 2  While ERISA's
preemption is undeniably broad, its exact contours remain difficult to
discern. As a result, states continue to attempt creative ways to include
employers in health care reform in ways that do not trigger ERISA
preemption. The latest example of this creativity involves state-
legislated economic incentives aimed at encouraging employers to
participate in state health care reform efforts. These incentives are
commonly referred to as "pay or play" laws. The idea is that employers
can choose to "play" by providing health care to their workers according
to state standards, or they can "pay" a monetary fee to the state in lieu of
providing such coverage. While ERISA clearly preempts state laws that
mandate employer-provided health coverage 3 or dictate what services4 or
to which employees coverage must be available,5 it is unclear whether
Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia. I am grateful for comments
received from participants in this symposium, participants in the University of Nebraska College of
Law Faculty Colloquium, Elizabeth Weeks, and Larry Hansen, and for research assistance provided
by Evan Fitts and Ben Hassebrock.
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1000-1461 (2000).
2. See id. § 1144(a) (providing that "the provisions of this title.., shall supersede any and all
state laws as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan"). There is a significant
exception for state laws regulating insurance, banking, or securities. Id. § I 144(b)(2)(A).
3. See, e.g., Dist. of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 125 (1992)
(preempting law requiring employers to provide health insurance coverage to those employees
eligible for workers' compensation benefits).
4. See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739 (state law mandating
mental health benefits "falls within the reach of ERISA's pre-emption provision").
5. See, e.g., Air Transp. Ass'n v. City of San Francisco, 992 F. Supp. 1149, 1180 (N.D. Cal.




and under what circumstances pay or play laws will survive ERISA
preemption.
Massachusetts, the most recent state to give pay or play laws a try,
has adopted two such provisions (over the veto of Governor Romney) as
part of its comprehensive health- care reform legislation.6  The first
provision is a "fair share employer contribution" that applies to
employers with more than ten employees who fail to make a "fair and
reasonable" contribution to employee health coverage.7 The amount of
the fair share contribution is capped at $295 per employee per year.
8
Additionally, employers with more than ten employees are subject to a
"free rider surcharge" if (1) the employer does not sponsor a cafeteria
plan to allow employees to pay health insurance premiums on a pre-tax
basis and (2) employees of the employer, or their dependents, access
state-provided free care above certain threshold amounts. 9 The fair share
contribution went into effect on October 1, 2006, and is the first such pay
or play provision to be implemented by any state.10 The free rider
surcharge is scheduled to go into effect on July 1, 2007.11 These
employer provisions are part of a comprehensive reform package that
includes a mandate that all state residents purchase health insurance if an
affordable policy is available to them, as well as individual and small
group insurance market reforms. Together with the employer provisions,
these reforms are aimed at dramatically increasing health insurance
coverage in the state. 12
While the Massachusetts fair share contribution is the first pay or
play law to go into effect, several states have previously passed pay or
play provisions. 13  Most of these provisions were repealed before they
6. An Act Providing Access to Affordable, Quality, Accountable Health Care, ch. 58, 2006
Mass. Acts (forthcoming), available at http://www.mass.gov/legis/laws/seslaw06/slO60058.htm
[hereinafter Mass. Plan]. The legislation is designed to dramatically decrease the number of
uninsured state residents, covering 95% of the currently uninsured within three years.
PRESENTATION TO THE JOINT CAUCUS FOR HOUSE MEMBERS, HEALTH CARE REFORM CONFERENCE
COMMITTEE BILL 2 (Apr. 3, 2006), http://www.mass.gov/legis/presentation.pdf. Many states,
including California, have expressed interest in similar reforms. See, e.g., Jim Carlton,
Schwarzenegger Embarks on Fight for Health Plan, WALL ST. J., Jan. 9, 2007, at A2 (analyzing
California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger's proposed plan to cover the uninsured).
7. Mass. Plan, supra note 6, § 47 (codified at MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 188).
8. Id.
9. Id. § 44 (codified at MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 1 18G § 18B).
10. Id. § 141.
11. An Act Further Regulating Health Care Access, ch. 450, 2006 Mass. Acts (forthcoming),
available at http://mass.gov/legis/laws/seslaws/sl060450.htm.
12. Stuart H. Altman & Michael Doonan, Can Massachusetts Lead the Way In Health Care
Reform?, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2093, 2093 (2006).
13. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 8.5-101-107 (West 2006); 1988 Mass. Legis.
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became effective. 14  To date, only one has been challenged in court,
Maryland's Fair Share Health Care Fund Act.' 5 The Maryland Act
would require employers with more than ten thousand employees in the
state to either (1) spend an amount equal to 8% of their payroll on
employee health care, or (2) pay to the state the difference between 8%
of their payroll and their health care spending.' 6 In evaluating whether
this pay or play law was preempted by ERISA, the district court had no
trouble in determining that it was. 17 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit upheld the district court's decision, in a two to one
split vote.' 8
Despite the ruling on Maryland's Fair Share Act, Massachusetts's
pay or play laws seem likely to survive a preemption challenge. Unlike
Maryland's Act, which has a very strong "pay" provision,
Massachusetts's fair share contribution law has a weak "pay"
provision-arguably allowing it to survive an ERISA preemption
challenge and be the first such law to do so. The free rider surcharge
may similarly survive ERISA preemption on the basis that it involves
only a premium-only cafeteria plan, which does not, by itself, relate to
any ERISA plan.
This Article begins in Part II with a brief overview of ERISA
preemption, and in Part III analyzes Retail Industry Leaders Association
Serv. 23 (West) (providing historical text of MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 118F); and 2003 Cal. Adv.
Legis. Serv. 673 (Deering) (the California Health Insurance Act of 2003). Massachusetts first
passed a pay or play law in 1998, which would have required employers to pay a fee equal to 12% of
payroll for full-time employees, with an offsetting credit against the fee for expenses incurred in
providing health coverage for employees. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 15 1A, § 14G(b) (West
2006) (repealed 1996). It was repealed prior to implementation. 1996 Mass. Acts ch. 203, § 4.
California's pay or play initiative, which was enacted by the legislature in 2003, would have
required employers to pay the state an amount equal to 80% of the cost of health insurance coverage
for their employees, waiving the fee only if the employer-provided health insurance coverage, paid
at least 80% of its cost, and the coverage met various requirements imposed by the state. 2003 Cal.
Legis. Serv. 673 (West). California's law was repealed by voters in November 2004 before it took
effect. See Jordan Rau et al., Election 2004 Healthcare Measures, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2004, at B I
(describing the rejection of Proposition 72 in the 2004 election). Pay or play laws are currently
under consideration in many states. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 2006-
2007 FAIR SHARE HEALTH CARE FUND OR "PAY OR PLAY" BILLS (2007), http://www.ncsl.
org/programs/health/payorplay2006.htm.
14. See supra note 13.
15. MD. CODE ANN., LAB & EMPL. § 8.5-101, 8.5-107 (West 2006). Other lawsuits against pay
or play legislation are currently pending. See, e.g., Retail Indus. Leaders Ass'n v. Suffolk County,
No. CV-06 531, 2005 WL 3782145 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2005) (challenging the Suffolk County
Program based on ERISA preemption); Golden Gate Restaurant Ass'n v. City of San Francisco, No.
C066997 JSW, 2006 WL 3853281 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2006) (challenging the San Francisco program
based on ERISA preemption).
16. MD. CODE ANN., LAB & EMPL. § 8.5-102, 8.5-104 (West 2006).
17. Retail Indus. Leaders Ass'n. v. Fielder, 435 F. Supp. 2d 481, 493-98(D. Md. 2006).
18. Retail Indus. Leaders Ass'n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180, 198 (4th Cir. 2007).
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v. Fielder, the case holding Maryland's pay or play law preempted by
ERISA. Part IV examines the Massachusetts fair share contribution,
concluding that its weak pay or play law is not a disguised mandate and
therefore is not likely to be preempted by ERISA. Part V turns to the
free rider surcharge, concluding that it likely escapes preemption because
compliance with the cafeteria plan requirement does not need to involve
any ERISA plan. Finally, Part VI examines what the Massachusetts
employer provisions are likely to contribute to health care reform and the
lessons that other states may be able to learn from Massachusetts's
efforts to involve employers in comprehensive health care reform.
II. ERISA PREEMPTION GENERALLY
This Section will provide a very brief overview of the evolution of
ERISA preemption jurisprudence, a complicated subject on which the
Supreme Court has ruled twenty times in the last thirty years, but which
nevertheless remains murky. Section 514 of ERISA contains an explicit,
and broad, preemption provision. It provides that ERISA generally
preempts "any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter
relate to any employee benefit plan." 19  An employee benefit plan
includes any employee pension benefit plan or employee welfare benefit
plan. 20 An employee pension benefit plan includes any plan, fund, or
program which is established or maintained by an employer to the extent
that such plan, fund, or program provides retirement income to
employees. An employee welfare benefit plan includes any plan, fund,
or program which is established or maintained by an employer to the
extent such plan, fund, or program provides certain welfare benefits,
including medical, surgical, or hospital care. 21  Under these broad
definitions, most employer-sponsored benefits are considered employee
benefit plans under ERISA.
In an effort to better define the scope of preemption, the Supreme
Court has held that a state law "'relates to' an employee benefit plan ...
if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan." 22 The subsections
below will examine how the "reference to" and "connection with"
standards have been interpreted by the Court.
19. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000).
20. Id. § 1002(3).
21. Id. §§ 1002(1), (2)(A).
22. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983) (citation omitted).
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A. A "Reference to" an Employee Benefit Plan
State laws are preempted by ERISA if the law has a reference to an
employee benefit plan.23 A state law references an employee benefit
plan if the law acts immediately and exclusively on such a plan, as did
the law in Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Service, Inc.24 The
relevant law in that case provided:
Funds or benefits of a pension, retirement, or employee benefit plan or
program subject to the provisions of the federal Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974, as amended, shall not be subject to the
process of garnishment ... unless such amishment is based upon a
judgment for alimony or for child support.
The law in that case applied only to ERISA plans and had an immediate
effect on such plans.26 As a result, it was held preempted on the grounds
that it contained an impermissible reference to an ERISA plan.
27
Where a law does not act immediately and exclusively on ERISA
plans, the Court has nonetheless found a "reference to" an ERISA plan
where the existence of ERISA plans is essential to the law's operation.28
The two Supreme Court cases that involve the "essential to the
operation" standard are District of Columbia v. Greater Washington
Board of Trade2 9 and Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon.3 ° In Greater
Washington Board of Trade, the existence of ERISA plans was essential
to the operation of the law because the law required that benefits for
injured employees be set by reference to the terms of existing ERISA
plans.3 1 In Ingersoll-Rand, the state law at issue provided employees
with a wrongful discharge cause of action specifically when a principal
reason for the termination was the employer's desire to avoid
23. Id.
24. 486 U.S. 825, 829 (1988).
25. Id. at 828 n.2 (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 18-4-22.1 (1982) (repealed 1990)).
26. Id. at 829-30.
27. Id. at 830.
28. Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316,
325 (1997).
29. 506 U.S. 125 (1992).
30. 498 U.S. 133 (1990).
31. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. at 130. The law in that case provided that "[a]ny
employer who provides health insurance coverage for an employee shall provide health insurance
coverage equivalent to the existing health insurance coverage of the employee while the employee
receives or is eligible to receive workers' compensation benefits under this chapter." Id. at 128
(citing D.C. CODE ANN. § 36-307(a-1)(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 1992)).
2007] 1207
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contributing to or paying benefits under the employer's pension plan.
3 2
Under that law, the existence of an ERISA pension plan was a critical
factor in establishing liability, and therefore essential to the law's
33operation.
The "reference to" standard, therefore, has limited application,
preempting laws only where (1) "a State's law acts immediately and
exclusively upon ERISA plans," or (2) "where the existence of ERISA
plans is essential to the law's operation."
34
B. A "Connection with" an Employee Benefit Plan
Even if a state law does not reference an ERISA plan, it may
nevertheless be considered to "relate to" such a plan if it has a
"connection with" such a plan.35  The leading case on the "connection
with" standard, New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield
Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co.,3 6 concerned a state law that provided
for hospital bill surcharges for patients whose insurance coverage was
provided by a commercial insurer other than Blue Cross Blue Shield.37
The surcharge was equal to 24% of the bill.38 The Court emphasized
that, in an area of traditional state regulation (such as health care) "the
historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by [federal
law] unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress."
39
Recognizing that the "relate to" language in section 514 of ERISA could
apply to nearly any state law as "universally, relations stop nowhere," the
Court declared that they "must go beyond the unhelpful text and the
frustrating difficulty of defining its key term, and look instead to the
objectives of the ERISA statute as a guide to the scope of the state law
that Congress understood would survive., 40 The Court then analyzed the
32. 498 U.S. at 140.
33. See id. (noting that "in order to prevail [under the state law], a plaintiff must plead, and the
court must find, that an ERISA plan exists and the employer had a pension-defeating motive in
terminating the employment").
34. Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316,
325 (1997).
35. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983).
36. 514 U.S. 645 (1995).
37. Id. at 649.
38. Id. at 650. HMOs were similarly charged a surcharge on hospital bills that was variable, up
to a maximum of"9% of the aggregate monthly charges paid by an HMO for its members' in-patient
hospital care." Id.
39. Id. at 655 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
40. Id. at 655-56 (internal citations omitted). Determining congressional intent is not
necessarily easy, as some believe that Congress gave little thought to the scope of preemption when
drafting ERISA, particularly as it applied to welfare plans. See Catherine L. Fisk, The Last Article
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history of ERISA and determined that "[t]he basic thrust of the pre-
emption clause ... was to avoid a multiplicity of regulation in order to
permit the nationally uniform administration of employee benefit
plans.'
In analyzing the state law, the Court distinguished the hospital
surcharge law from state laws that mandate employee benefit structures
or their administration, which courts have consistently held to be
preempted by ERISA.42 While the Court acknowledged that the New
York state law made Blue Cross Blue Shield insurance attractive to
ERISA health plans, it characterized the law's effect as having "an
indirect economic effect on choices made by insurance buyers, including
ERISA plans. 43  The Court emphasized that an indirect economic
influence did not "bind plan administrators to any particular choice.
' 44
The Court quoted its previous pronouncement in Greater Washington
Board of Trade that "[p]re-emption does not occur... if the state law has
only a tenuous, remote, or peripheral connection with covered plans, as is
the case with many laws of general applicability."4 5 The Court then went
on to characterize the New York law as one of general health care
regulation.46 It concluded that "cost uniformity was almost certainly not
an object of pre-emption, just as laws with only an indirect economic
effect on the relative costs of various health insurance packages in a
given State are a far cry from those 'conflicting directives' from which
Congress meant to insulate ERISA plans. 47
Particularly important for our purposes is the Court's discussion of
when an indirect economic incentive turns into a clearly preempted
substantive mandate. The Court explained that "there might be a point at
which an exorbitant tax leaving consumers with a Hobson's choice
would be treated as imposing a substantive mandate." 48  The Court
found, however, that no showing had been made that the surcharges
imposed by the New York law were "so prohibitive as to force all health
insurance consumers to contract with" Blue Cross Blue Shield.49 In its
About the Language of ERISA Preemption? A Case Study of the Failure of Textualism, 33 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 35, 52-57 (1996).
41. 514 U.S. at 657.
42. See id. at 657-58.
43. Id. at 659.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 661 (internal citation omitted).
46. Id. at 660-61.
47. Id. at 662.
48. Id. at 664.
49. Id. ("As they currently stand, the surcharges do not require plans to deal with only one
insurer, or to insure against an entire category of illnesses they might otherwise choose to leave
2007] 1209
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holding, the Court specified that "we do not hold today that ERISA pre-
empts only direct regulation of ERISA plans" and acknowledged that "a
state law might produce such acute, albeit indirect, economic effects, by
intent or otherwise, as to force an ERISA plan to adopt a certain scheme
of substantive coverage or effectively restrict its choice of insurers, and
that such a state law might indeed be pre-empted under § 514."' 0 The
New York surcharges, the Court held, do not force such choices and
"affect only indirectly the relative prices of insurance policies.",51 As a
result, the Court found that the New York surcharges were not preempted
by ERISA.52
In the years since Travelers, the Court has not strayed far from its
analysis. While the Court has toyed with embracing an explicit conflict
preemption standard, it has not done so. 53  The "connection with"
standard remains one of magnitude, focused on whether the law at issue
interferes with ERISA's primary objectives. As the Court in Egelhoffv.
Egelhoff summarized, "we look both to the objectives of the ERISA
statute as a guide to the scope of the state law that Congress understood
would survive, as well as to the nature of the effect of the state law on
ERISA plans. 54 Benefit mandating statutes consistently have been held
preempted under this test.55 State laws that intrude on core ERISA
concerns, such as the primacy of plan documents, the payment of plan
benefits, and the ability of an employer to provide a nationally uniform
benefits package have also been preempted under this standard.56
Nevertheless, economic incentives that do not bind plan administrators to
a particular choice have withstood preemption challenges.57
without coverage.").
50. Id. at 668 (emphasis added).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 152-53 (2001) (Scalia, J. and Ginsburg, J.,
concurring).
54. Id. at 147 (internal citations omitted).
55. See, e.g., Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 100 (1983) (holding that a state law
was preempted given the "the plain language of § 514(a), the structure of the Act, and its legislative
history").
56. See, e.g., Egelhoff 532 U.S. at 146-50 (2001) (Scalia, J. and Ginsburg, J., concurring)
(summarizing previous decisions).
57. See, e.g., Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc., 519
U.S. 316, 334 (1997) (holding that state "statute alters the incentives, but does not dictate . . .
choices" and thus withstands ERISA preemption); N.Y. State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield
Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 668 (1995) (holding that state law that did not "effectively
restrict.., choice of insurers" was not preempted by ERISA).
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II1. THE STRONG PAY OR PLAY LAW-MARYLAND'S FAIR SHARE ACT
In 2006, Maryland enacted the Fair Share Health Care Fund Act
(hereinafter the "Maryland Act"), requiring employers with more than
ten thousand employees in the state to either (1) contribute 8% of their
payroll to employee health care or health insurance, or (2) pay to the
state an amount equal to the difference between what the employer
spends on employee health care and 8% of payroll.5 8 The law (which in
practice would apply only to Wal-Mart), was promptly challenged by the
Retail Industry Leaders Association (RILA). 9
The challenge by RILA to the Maryland Act represented the first
time a court has had the opportunity to rule on a state pay or play law.
The district court held the Act preempted by ERISA under the
"connection with" standard.6 ° In undertaking its analysis, the court
examined "(1) 'the objectives of the ERISA statute as a guide to the
scope of the state law that Congress understood would survive,' and (2)
'the nature of the effect of the state law on ERISA plans."'
61
With respect to the first factor, the court stated that the main
objective of ERISA was to permit nationally uniform benefit plan
administration.62 The court found that the Maryland Act would violate
this objective by subjecting employers to a potentially great number of
state, local, and municipal laws dictating health care spending, and
would require employers to "segregate a separate pool of expenditures
for its Maryland employees and structure its contributions-and
employees' deductibles and co-pays-with an eye to how this will affect
the Act's 8% spending requirement."
63
With respect to the second factor, the court found that the "intended
effect" of the Act was to force Wal-Mart to spend at least 8% of total
wages on health care, and therefore the second factor was "fully
satisfied. '64 The court found that Travelers offered the state no help in
58. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. §§ 8.5-104(b), 8.5-101(d)(1) (West 2006).
59. Retail Indus. Leaders Ass'n v. Fielder, 435 F. Supp. 2d 481, 484 (D. Md. 2006), aff'd, 475
F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 2007). For a detailed analysis of the Maryland Act and ERISA preemption, see
Edward A. Zelinsky, Maryland's "Wal-Mart" Act: Policy and Preemption, 28 CARDOZO L. REV.
847, 850-78 (2006).
60. Retail Indus. Leaders Ass 'n, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 494. Because the court held the Act
preempted under the "connection with" standard, it did not analyze the Act under the "reference to"
standard. Id.
61. Id. (quoting Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 147).
62. Id.




overcoming preemption because there was no authority in that case to
suggest that state statutes mandating that an employer provide a certain
monetary level of welfare benefits in an ERISA plan should survive
preemption.6 5
The court then analogized the Maryland law to a benefit mandating
law, apparently based on the premise that, given the choice between
spending 8% of payroll on employee health care or paying an equal
amount of money to the state, "no rational employer would choose to pay
the State. 66  The choice is characterized as a Hobson's choice and, as
noted in Travelers, a Hobson's choice "'would be treated as imposing a
substantive mandate.'
67
In a two to one decision, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
upheld the decision of the district court. 68 The appellate court used very
similar reasoning to the district court in coming to its conclusion that the
Maryland Act was preempted by ERISA. The court began by
emphasizing that the primary objective of ERISA was to provide a
uniform regulatory regime over employee benefit plans, and that
preemption is meant to protect ERISA plans from complying with
conflicting directives of the states.69  With respect to the pay or play
aspect of the law, the court stated bluntly that "[a] state law that directly
regulates the structuring or administration of an ERISA plan is not saved
by inclusion of a means for opting out of its requirements., 70 The court
seemed to temper this position when it later explained that "[e]ven if a
state law provides a route by which ERISA plans can avoid the state
law's requirements, taking that route might still be too disruptive of
uniform plan administration to avoid preemption.",
71
In evaluating the effect of the law, the Fourth Circuit agreed with the
district court that no reasonable employer would pay the fee to the
65. Id.
66. Id. at 495, 497. One of the court's assumptions was that an amount equal to 8% of payroll
could, in reality, only be spent in an ERISA plan. Id. at 497.
67. Id. at 497 (quoting N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 664 (1995)).
68. Retail Indus. Leaders Ass'n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180, 183 (4th Cir. 2007).
69. Id. at 191.
70. Id. at 192. The court cites Egelhoff in support of this position. In Egelhoff employers
could opt out of the state law at issue by including specific language in the plan document. Despite
this "opt out," the Court held the law was preempted because the law mandated that plan
administrators "either follow Washington's beneficiary designation scheme or alter the terms of their
plan[s] so as to indicate that they will not follow it." Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 150
(2001).
71. Retail Indus. Leaders Ass'n, 475 F.3d at 193.
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state.72 Because the court found that the "only rational choice" was for
employers to structure their ERISA plans to meet the minimum spending
threshold, the Act was considered a benefit mandating law and therefore
clearly preempted.73
In the end, the ruling on Maryland's law in large part turns on the
effective lack of choice given to employers. Employers must either (1)
spend at least 8% of payroll on providing health care to their employees,
or (2) remit the difference between what they spend on health care and
8% of payroll to the State of Maryland. As both decisions point out, no
rational employer would ever choose option number two.7 4  The
connection with employee benefit plans is very strong-the Maryland
Act essentially mandates that employers create an employee benefit plan
and spend at least 8% of payroll on such a plan. The law therefore goes
beyond the mere indirect economic incentive approved in Travelers and
instead binds employers to certain choices, and infringes on an area of
core ERISA concern-the national uniformity in benefit offerings.
While Maryland's strong pay or play law was preempted because of
the effective mandate it put in place, the section below analyzes
Massachusetts's fair share contribution pay or play law, which has a
much weaker pay provision-potentially allowing the law to survive
ERISA preemption.
IV. THE WEAK PAY OR PLAY LAW-MASSACHUSETTS'S FAIR SHARE
CONTRIBUTION
The Massachusetts health care reform legislation contains two pay or
play provisions that are potentially preempted by ERISA. The first, the
fair share contribution (FSC), gives employers the option of playing by
making a "fair and reasonable" contribution to employee health care or
paying a fee to the state. 75 The FSC applies to employers with more than
ten employees who do not mike a "fair and reasonable" contribution to
employee health care coverage. 76 An employer satisfies the "fair and
reasonable" standard when it offers a group health plan and either (1) at
least 25% of full time employees are enrolled in the plan and the
72. Id. at 197.
73. Id. at 193. The court also notes that this is the effect the Maryland General Assembly
intended the Act to have, and that the fee creates an "irresistible incentive" to provide employees
with a greater level of health insurance. Id. at 194.
74. Id. at 193; Retail Indus. Leaders Ass'n, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 497.




employer is making a contribution toward it, or (2) the employer offers
to pay at least one third of the cost of coverage under the plan.77 The
amount of the fee is capped at $295 per employee, per year. 78 Because
of the modest--or weak-penalty associated with the fair share
contribution, it will likely survive an ERISA preemption challenge
because it is a mere indirect economic incentive for a plan administrator
to make certain choices with respect to its health care plan.
A. "Reference to"
Under current ERISA jurisprudence, the FSC will be preempted if it
either contains an impermissible reference to an ERISA plan or has an
impermissible connection with such a plan. A state law contains an
impermissible reference to an ERISA plan where it "acts immediately
and exclusively upon ERISA plans ... or where the existence of ERISA
plans is essential to the law's operation., 79 Under the first standard, the
FSC does not appear to contain a reference to an ERISA plan. The FSC
does not act immediately and exclusively upon ERISA plans because it
applies to all employers, including those exempt from ERISA. 80
A reference to an ERISA plan also does not appear to be found under
the second standard. Unlike Greater Washington Board of Trade and
Ingersoll-Rand, the Massachusetts FSC does not set benefits by reference
to an ERISA plan, nor rely on the existence of ERISA plans in any way.
Pursuant to the FSC law, an employer need not sponsor an ERISA plan,
it can simply pay the designated fee. While an employer may be exempt
from the FSC if it sponsors an ERISA plan meeting certain parameters,
the law can easily operate and be enforced without the existence of any
ERISA plans. Because the existence of an ERISA plan is not essential to
the FSC's operation, the FSC should not be preempted under the
"reference to" standard.
77. 114.5 MASS. CODE REGS. 16.03 (2006).
78. Mass. Plan, supra note 6, § 47. Approximately 8% of the 35,000 employers in
Massachusetts with more than ten employees are expected to be affected by the fair share
contribution. Massachusetts Proposes Minimum Standard for Employer-Based Care Under New
Law, BNA HEALTH CARE DAILY REP., July 5, 2006. The resulting revenue is estimated at $26
million. Id.
79. Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316,
325 (1997).
80. While most employers are subject to ERISA, government and church employers are
generally exempt. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b) (2006).
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B. "Connection with"
The FSC does not appear to have an impermissible connection with
an ERISA plan. To determine whether a law has an impermissible
connection with an ERISA plan, we must examine (1) "'the objectives of
the ERISA statute as a guide to the scope of the state law that Congress
understood would survive,"' and (2) "'the nature of the effect of the state
law on ERISA plans.' 8'
It is well acknowledged that a primary purpose of ERISA was to
permit the nationally uniform administration of employee benefit plans,
and that preemption issues must be analyzed with that primary goal in
mind. The FSC does raise issues concerning the nationally uniform
administration of employee benefit plans. In order to be exempt from the
FSC, employers must meet the coverage or contribution requirements
imposed by the Massachusetts Division of Health Care Financing and
Policy. That is, they must either cover 25% of full-time workers and
contribute toward the coverage, 82 or pay one third of the cost of coverage
under the employer plan. For a national employer to be exempt from the
fee, it would potentially need to alter its benefit administration in
Massachusetts. The question is whether the small size of the FSC
effectively eliminates the concern. While the Fourth Circuit in RILA
held that the Maryland Act violated a fundamental purpose of ERISA by
preventing nationally uniform benefit administration, this holding
appears to be based on the court's conclusion that the law functioned as a
mandate due to the "irresistible incentive" given to employers to spend
8% of payroll in their ERISA plans. 83 Unlike the Maryland Act, the size
of the FSC does not appear to force an employer's decision.
Instead of forcing an employer's decision, the FSC simply provides a
small financial incentive for employers to comply with the FSC
standards. Employers may elect to (1) sponsor a health plan that either
covers 25% of its workers or for which they pay one third of the
premium, or (2) pay a $295 fee per employee per year to the state.
84
What makes this law an interesting contrast to Maryland's Fair Share Act
is that under the Massachusetts law it would, in almost all instances, be
rational to elect option two. 85 That is, to the extent the contribution
81. Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 147 (2001) (citing Cal. Div. of Labor Standards
Enforcement, 519 U.S. at 325).
82. MASS. CODE REG. 16.03.
83. Retail Indus. Leaders Ass'n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180, 193 (4th Cir. 2007).
84. See supra text accompanying notes 75-78.
85. Assuming no other costs or benefits, the $295 per employee fee would in most cases be less
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provides incentives, it provides them to pay the FSC rather than adopt or
amend an ERISA plan. On this view, the FSC does not require an
employer to either adopt or amend an ERISA plan as the Maryland law
does.
The FSC, then, looks more like an indirect economic incentive of the
type at issue in Travelers.86 In Travelers, the effect of the New York
state law was to make Blue Cross Blue Shield insurance economically
more attractive than any other funding mechanism for ERISA health
plans (as well as for any other hospital expense payor).87 The incentive
was not insignificant, with a surcharge for non-Blue Cross Blue Shield
payors of up to 24%.88 Nonetheless, the Court found that a generally
applicable law in an area of traditional state regulation was not
preempted by ERISA where it did not dictate choices or mandate
benefits. 89  The FSC appears to have a similar effect. It changes
(slightly) an employer's incentives regarding health plan choices-in this
case whether to offer a plan and whether to structure it to meet the 25%
coverage or 33% contribution standard. As such, under a Travelers
analysis, the FSC likely will not be seen as unduly interfering with the
objectives of ERISA concerning nationally uniform benefit
administration. It is clear, for example, that a state law requiring ERISA
plans to use Blue Cross Blue Shield to finance benefits would be
preempted by ERISA as interfering with nationally uniform benefit
administration. Similarly, if Massachusetts required all employers to
either cover 25% of their full-time employees or pay 33% of employee
health insurance premiums, such a law would be preempted. But it
seems that both survive preemption if there is a relatively modest
financial disincentive associated with making different choices.
expensive than either covering 25% of employees under an employer plan and "contributing to"
coverage or paying 33% of the premium for coverage under an employer plan, given that in 2005 the
average premium for employer-based coverage in Massachusetts was reported to be $8,280 per
employee. See MasslNC, Commonwealth Agenda 2006: Health Care, COMMONWEALTH: ONLINE
EXCLUSIVES 2 (2006), http://www.massinc.org/fileadmin/onlineexclusives/agenda_2006/health
care.pdf (citing the 2005 National Survey of Employer-Sponsored Health Plans conducted by
Mercer Human Resources Consulting). This is consistent with testimony that the purpose of the
FSC was not to mandate employer coverage, but rather to make non-providing employers share
some of the costs associated with uninsured state residents that are currently borne by employers
who do provide health insurance coverage to their workers. See Michael Widmer, President of
Mass. Found., Testimony in Support of Determination of Employer Fair Share Contribution (Aug.
8, 2006), http://www.masstaxpayers.org/data/pdf/bulletins/employ-l.pdf (discussing rationale
behind FSC fee).
86. N.Y. State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645
(1995).
87. Id. at 659.
88. Id. at 650.
89. Id. at 668.
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One concern the RILA court noted was the potential for a multiplicity
of pay or play regulation.9" When considering strong pay or play laws,
one could imagine a large multi-state employer having to potentially play
under numerous state, local, and city laws. The effect of multiple weak
pay or play laws on a multi-state employer, however, would be quite
different. Multiple weak pay or play laws would simply involve the
administrative inconvenience of checking the employer's plan against
any requirements of the law and paying a small fee if necessary. Strong
pay or play laws would actually require changes to the employer's
ERISA plan in each of the jurisdictions. That type of compulsion is what
ERISA preemption was trying to prevent.9' It is unlikely that ERISA
was meant to preempt the imposition of small fees of the type present in
the Massachusetts law.92 Again an analogy can be made to Travelers.
The type of law at issue in Travelers-a hospital surcharge law that
provided indirect economic incentives to ERISA plans to make certain
choices in how to fund their plans-could be enacted in multiple
jurisdictions and not be preempted. A multi-state employer would have
to keep track of, and weigh, whether or not to make changes to its
ERISA plan in each jurisdiction to take advantage of the incentives, or
whether to accept the increased cost of making different choices. The
Supreme Court in Travelers did not let concerns about this type of
multiplicity of regulation affect its analysis, 93 nor does it appear likely
that such concerns would affect the preemption analysis of weak pay or
play laws.
The RILA court, however, stated that "a state law that directly
regulates the structuring or administration of an ERISA plan is not saved
by inclusion of a means for opting out of its requirements. 94 District
courts in both the First and the Ninth Circuit have made similar rulings in
cases involving city ordinances requiring entities choosing to do business
with the city to offer benefits to domestic partners on the same terms as
spouses.95 In RILA and the domestic partner cases, however, the laws at
90. Retail Indus. Leaders Ass'n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180, 194 (4th Cir. 2007).
91. Id.
92. See Travelers, 514 U.S. at 661-62 ("In sum, cost uniformity was almost certainly not an
object of pre-emption.").
93. Id.
94. Retail Indus. Leaders Ass n, 475 F.3d at 192.
95. See Catholic Charities of Maine, Inc. v. City of Portland, 304 F. Supp. 2d 77, 92-93 (D.
Me. 2004) (holding that health benefit domestic partners non-discrimination requirements are
preempted by ERISA); Air Transp. Ass'n v. City of San Francisco, 992 F. Supp. 1149, 1180 (N.D.
Cal. 1998) (same).
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issue have been found to leave the employer with no effective choice but
to modify its ERISA plans.96
In Air Transport Association of America v. City of San Francisco,
97
the air transport industry challenged a San Francisco ordinance that
prohibited the city from entering into contracts with any entity that did
not provide employee benefits on an equal basis to domestic partners as
compared to spouses.98  The court held that, as applied to airport
contracts, the ordinance was largely preempted by ERISA.99 In its
preemption analysis, the court easily found a "connection with" an
ERISA plan upon examining whether the purpose and effect of the
ordinance interfered with Congress's objectives in enacting ERISA. 100 It
found that the ordinance's purpose was to require contractors to modify
discriminatory employee benefit plans, and that the effect of the law
would be the same. 10 In addressing the City's Travelers-based "indirect
economic effect" argument, 10 2 the court asked whether the ordinance
escaped preemption because it applied only to those companies with
which the City does business.10 3  The court suggested that such an
outcome would occur only where "the City wields no more power than
an ordinary consumer in its contracting relationships.' 0 4  The City, the
court found, exerted more economic power at the airport than an ordinary
consumer would, due to the City's monopoly position as the airport
96. As discussed below, only RILA and Air Transportation Ass 'n are explicit in their "effective
mandate" analysis. See discussion infra notes 97-115 and accompanying text (describing how each
court found a mandate in the statute, even though the statute purported to offer an option). Two
other cases, Catholic Charities and Council of New York v. Bloomberg, 846 N.E.2d 433 (N.Y. 2006),
similarly ruled on city ordinances that required employers who did business with the city to provide
benefits to the domestic partners of employees on the same basis that such benefits were provided to
spouses. Both held the city ordinances to be preempted by ERISA. Catholic Charities, 304 F. Supp.
2d at 92-93; Council of New York, 846 N.E.2d at 441. Neither decision, however, provides much
guidance that is useful to our pay or play analysis. In Catholic Charities, the court simply states that
"none of the Supreme Court cases suggests that a state law is saved from preemption just because its
mandate is conditional." 304 F. Supp. at 92. In Council of New York, the court held the law
preempted on the basis that the law is "exactly what ERISA, as interpreted in Shaw, prohibits-to
prescribe the terms of benefit plans." Council of New York, 846 N.E.2d at 441. The court then
dismissed the city's argument for a market participant exception to ERISA preemption, finding that
the city in this case was acting as a regulator, not a proprietor, when it used "its bargaining leverage
as a means of attaining policy ends." Id. In neither case does the court engage the Travelers-based
argument regarding indirect economic incentives.
97. 992 F. Supp. 1149 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
98. Id. at 1155.
99. Id. at 1180.
100. Id. at 1176.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1167.
103. Id. at 1176.
104. ld. at 1180.
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proprietor. 0 5 It was on this basis that the court found that the ordinance
was "largely preempted by ERISA when applied to airport contracts."'
0 6
This holding can be reconciled with the statement in Travelers that an
economic influence can be so substantial as to function as a mandate and
create a Hobson's choice. 10 7  While this is not explicit in the Air
Transport opinion, the court's argument is essentially that the City's
monopoly position as airport proprietor results in airlines having no
choice but to do business with the City, and, therefore, no choice but to
modify their employee benefit plans in accordance with the ordinance.
The fact that the ordinance only applied to employers who chose to enter
into contracts with the City did not save it from preemption.
The appellate decision in RILA used very similar reasoning. The
court stated that the fact that the law is optional does not save it from
preemption, but it also found that the law involves a Hobson's choice,
leaving a rational employer with no choice but to modify its ERISA
plan.10 8 As Travelers tells us, where there is no effective choice, the law
mandates benefits and is preempted by ERISA. 10 9 Essentially, the RILA
court found that spending 8% of payroll costs on an ERISA plan was not
optional. Because there is a genuine choice associated with the
Massachusetts FSC, a choice that was not present in either RILA or Air
Transport, the FSC should not be preempted.
The RILA court cited Egelhoff in support of its position that the fact
that a law is optional does not save it from preemption." I0 In Egelhoff,
the state law at issue, which governed beneficiary designations following
a divorce, operated essentially as a default."' The law did not apply if
the plan sponsor included specific language in the plan document."12 The
choices in Egelhoff were then to (1) comply with a law that was in direct
conflict with ERISA, or (2) amend your ERISA plan to avoid the law's
application. 1 3  Each choice, individually, would be preempted by
ERISA. The first option, complying with the state law, the Court easily
found preempted as conflicting with a fundamental concern of ERISA-
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. N.Y. State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645,
664 (1995).
108. Retail Indus. Leaders Ass'n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180, 197 (4th Cir. 2007).
109. N.Y. State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645,
664 (1995).
110. Retail Indus. Leaders Ass'n, 475 F.3d at 182.





paying plan benefits in accordance with plan documents."14 The second
choice would also be preempted by ERISA because it would require plan
administrators to modify their ERISA plans. 15 As a result, regardless of
the choice, the law related to an ERISA plan. This is not the case with
the choices given to employers under the Massachusetts FSC. While
requiring an employer to cover a certain percentage of employees or pay
a certain percentage of employee premiums would clearly be preempted
by ERISA as a benefit mandating law, the second choice is to pay a
modest monetary fee to the state. The fee in no way implicates an
ERISA plan. It does not relate to an employee benefit plan and should
not be preempted. Rather, the FSC involves an indirect economic
incentive to make certain choices regarding ERISA plans, but does not
dictate such choices. Under Travelers, the FSC should not be preempted
by ERISA.
V. THE CAFETERIA PLAN PAY OR PLAY LAW-MASSACHUSETTS'S
FREE RIDER SURCHARGE
The second Massachusetts pay or play law, the free rider surcharge
(FRS), applies to employers with more than ten employees who do not
"contribute to or arrange for" employee health coverage if employees
access free state health care above a certain threshold. 116 The amount of
the surcharge varies from 10% to 100% of the state's cost, based on the
number of incidents of free care in the past year, the number of
employees, and "the proportion of employees for whom the.., employer
provides health insurance." 117 While the penalty can be steep, the FRS
can be avoided by merely offering employees the ability to pay for health
insurance on a pre-tax basis through a cafeteria plan." 8 While the nature
of the penalty suggests that Massachusetts was interested in requiring
employers to actually pay for their employees' health care, the fact that
an employer is exempt from the surcharge merely for offering a
premium-only cafeteria plan suggests that what the FRS really is meant
114. Id. at 147.
115. Id. at 151.
116. Mass. Plan, supra note 6, §§ 32, 44. Whether the free rider surcharge applies will be set
forth in regulations and is based on factors such as how many times a single employee of the
employer accesses free care. Id. § 44. Even if the employee utilization thresholds have been met,
however, the free rider surcharge is only triggered once the state has expended $50,000 or more in
providing care to the employer's employees. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. § 32 (defining non-providing employer).
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to accomplish is making health insurance more affordable for
individuals.
It is understandable why Massachusetts included this requirement in
its health reform legislation. Under current law, employees are only able
to pay for health insurance on a pre-tax basis if it is purchased through
their employer and their employer offers premium payment through a
cafeteria plan.1 9 If an individual buys coverage on the individual
market, the premiums are only deductible if the individual is self-
employed. 120  For most individuals, the ability to pay health insurance
premiums on a pre-tax basis provides a very significant cost savings,
making coverage more affordable and, in turn, making an individual
more likely to acquire health insurance121
A cafeteria plan is a plan established pursuant to section 125 of the
Internal Revenue Code, which allows participants to elect to receive cash
or some combination of qualified benefits. 122  One of the qualified
benefits that may be offered under a cafeteria plan is employer-provided
health insurance.123  A premium-only cafeteria plan is, as the name
implies, a cafeteria plan where the only benefit that is offered is the
ability to pay insurance premiums on a pre-tax basis. A premium-only
cafeteria plan is not, by itself, considered an employee benefit plan
governed by ERISA. 124 When an employer allows the pre-tax payments
of ERISA health plan premiums through a cafeteria plan, however, the
cafeteria plan is considered a funding mechanism of the ERISA plan and
119. Under § 106 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, employer contributions to coverage
under an accident or health plan are excluded from an employee's gross income. I.R.C. § 106
(2000). A premium-only cafeteria plan allows employees to make an election to reduce their cash
compensation by the amount of their health insurance premiums. In turn, the employer pays the
premiums on behalf of the employee. Because the contributions are now considered employer
contributions under § 106, they are exempt from the employee's income and are effectively paid on
a pre-tax basis. Utilizing a cafeteria plan is the only means by which to make an employee's
contributions toward health insurance excludable from income. President Bush has recently
proposed amending the tax treatment of health insurance so that all individuals can deduct up to a
certain amount of health insurance premiums from their taxable income, eliminating the preferential
treatment provided to employer-provided coverage. See WHITE HOUSE NAT'L ECON. COUNCIL,
REFORMING HEALTH CARE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 6 (2006), available at http://www.whitehouse.
gov/stateoftheunion/2006/healthcare/healthcarebooklet.pdf ("Premiums for HSA-compatible
insurance would be deductible.., when purchased on the individual market.").
120. I.R.C. § 162()(1)(B) (2000).
121. For a detailed examination of the effect of the pre-tax payment of health insurance
premiums, see Paul Fronstin, Issue Brief No. 294: The Tax Treatment of Health Insurance and
Employment-Based Health Benefits, EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST., June 2006, available at http://www.
ebri.org/publications/ib/index.cfm?fa=ibDisp&contentid=3642.
122. I.R.C. § 125(d).
123. I.R.C. §§ 125(0, 106(a).
124. Dep't of Labor Op. Ltr. 96-12A (July 17, 1996).
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therefore a part of such a plan. 12 5 The extent to which a premium-only
cafeteria plan constitutes part of an ERISA plan, then, turns on whether
the premiums are paid to an ERISA plan or whether they are used to pay
premiums on a health insurance policy not governed by ERISA.
In determining whether the health benefits funded by a premium-
only cafeteria plan constitute an ERISA plan, the involvement of the
employer is key. As stated previously, an employee welfare benefit plan
is a plan, fund, or program established or maintained by an employer to
the extent the plan, fund, or program provides certain specified benefits,
including medical benefits. 126  For our current purposes, the phrase
"established or maintained by an employer" is critical. It is possible that
an employer could make health insurance available to employees but its
involvement not rise to the level of employer sponsorship. In such a
case, the health insurance would not be considered a plan subject to
ERISA. A safe harbor contained in Department of Labor regulations
provides that an employer will not be considered to have established or
maintained an ERISA plan when it makes available to employees a
group or group-type insurance program offered by an insurer, under
which:
(1) No contributions are made by an employer or employee
organization; (2) Participation [in] the program is completely voluntary
for employees or members; (3) The sole functions of the employer...
with respect to the program are, without endorsing the program, to
permit the insurer to publicize the program to employees or members,
to collect premiums through payroll deductions or dues checkoffs and
to remit them to the insurer; and (4) The employer . . .receives no
consideration in the form of cash or otherwise in connection with the
program, other than reasonable compensation, excluding any profit, for
administrative services actuall rendered in connection with payroll
deductions or dues checkoffs.12
In determining whether an employer has endorsed a program under the
third factor, one must examine whether the employer's actions would
lead an employee to reasonably conclude that the employer did more
than merely facilitate the program's availability. 128 For example, where
125. Id.
126. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2000).
127. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-10) (2006).
128. Johnson v. Watts Regulator Co., 63 F.3d 1129, 1135 (5th Cir. 1995) ("[Ain employer will
be said to have endorsed a program within the purview of the Secretary's safe harbor regulation if, in
light of all the surrounding facts and circumstances, an objectively reasonable employee would
conclude on the basis of the employer's actions that the employer had not merely facilitated the
program's availability but had exercised control over it or made it appear to be part and parcel of the
1222 [Vol. 55
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an employer is responsible for plan design or determining employee
eligibility for coverage, courts have found the employer's role rises
beyond merely making the program available to employees.
129
No court has addressed the specific issue of whether an employer can
make a group insurance program available to employees through a
cafeteria plan but still fall under the safe harbor excluding the program
from the definition of an ERISA plan. 130  The use of a cafeteria plan to
allow the pre-tax payment of premiums, however, does not appear to
necessarily result in an insurance arrangement being considered an
ERISA plan.13 ' It is not obvious that a cafeteria plan functions as
company's own benefit package."); see also Dep't of Labor Op. Ltr. 94-24A (July 1, 1994).
129. See, e.g., Butero v. Royal Maccabees Life Ins. Co., 174 F.3d 1207, 1213-14 (11 th cir.
1999) (finding the safe harbor barred where the employer picked the insurer, decided on key terms
such as portability and the amount of coverage, deemed some employees ineligible to participate,
incorporated the policy terms into the plan description for its cafeteria plan, and retained power to
alter compensation reduction for tax purposes).
130. While some courts have found group insurance arrangements made available through
cafeteria plans do not qualify for the safe harbor excluding such plans from ERISA coverage, none
of the holdings turned on the utilization of a cafeteria plan. See id. (finding the cafeteria plan at
issue did not fall under the safe harbor provision because of the employer's actions, not because of
the cafeteria plan's structure).
13 1. Several decisions do take into account the tax treatment of premium payments in
determining whether the employer has made a contribution to the insurance arrangement. However,
these cases examine the tax treatment of contributions to determine whether the amounts are
employer or employee contributions. See, e.g., B-T Dissolution, Inc. v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins.
Co., 175 F. Sul p. 978, 985 (2001) ("[E]xamining the tax consequences of the premium payments
helps reveal who really 'paid' them."). However, some courts have found that merely enabling
premium payments to be made on a pre-tax basis constitutes an "employer contribution" for
purposes of the safe harbor. See Brown v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., No. CIV.A. 01-1931, 2002 WL
1019021, at *7 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (stating that the employer contributed to the policy by "enabling
payments from pre-tax income" and by providing a premium discount). In the context of a cafeteria
plan, it seems illogical to suggest that allowing pre-tax payment of premiums results in an employer
contribution, as section 125 is intended to allow such pre-tax contributions from an employee's
salary. In determining the source of the funds for cafeteria plan contributions, pre-tax salary
contributions clearly come from the employee rather than the employer. In this respect, the court in
Schwartz v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 280 F. Supp. 2d 937, 941 (D. Ariz. 2003), appears to
have the more persuasive analysis, stating, "[t]he dispositive question is whether [the employer]
actually absorbed any portion of the cost of those premiums." In the case of a cafeteria plan, the
employer has absorbed no such cost, despite the fact that such amounts are not included in the
employee's taxable income. There are also cases which suggest that providing employees with a
benefit they cannot receive as individuals, such as a group purchase discount, is sufficient to fail the
safe harbor requirements, either because it is considered an employer contribution or because it is
evidence of employer endorsement. See, e.g., Brown v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 2002 WL
1019021, at *7; Stenger v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 121 F. Supp. 1238 (E.D. Wisc.
2000). However, these cases rely on language in Treasury regulations concerning the definition of a
group health plan [for purposes of COBRA] to reach their conclusion, reliance that seems misplaced
in this context. Several courts have held that a group purchase discount does not negate the
Department of Labor safe harbor for group insurance purchasing arrangements. See, e.g., Schwartz,
280 F. Supp. 2d at 939; Rubin v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 174 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1118-19 (D. Or.
2001).
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anything more than a payroll deduction, and no court has suggested
otherwise. However, an employer would need to be knowledgeable of
the ERISA safe harbor and take steps to ensure that its conduct did not
rise to the level of endorsement of the program. Where the benefit is
included in a cafeteria plan that offers multiple benefits, this would
require careful communication on the employer's part. 132 Nonetheless, it
appears that an employer could offer a premium-only cafeteria plan to
permit employees to pay for insurance coverage that is not part of an
ERISA plan. This conclusion is critical for the ERISA preemption
analysis that follows.
A. The "Reference to" Standard
As detailed previously, a state law is preempted where it "acts
immediately and exclusively upon ERISA plans . . . or where the
existence of [ERISA] plans is essential to [the law's] operation." 133 The
FRS seems to easily escape preemption under this standard. As
explained above, it is possible to have a premium-only cafeteria plan that
is not considered part of an ERISA plan,134 and, for the same reason,
ERISA plans are not essential to the law's operation.
B. The "Connection with" Standard
In order to determine whether a law has an impermissible connection
with an ERISA plan we must examine (1) "the objectives of the ERISA
statute as a guide to the scope of the state law that Congress understood
would survive,"1 35 and (2) "'the nature of the effect of the state law on
ERISA plans."",
136
132. For example, the benefit that is intended to be covered by the safe harbor should not appear
to employees to be part of the same package as other ERISA-covered benefit plans. The employer
should not draft summaries for the ERISA-exempt plan that appear identical to its other benefit plan
summaries, nor should the forms that are used for the ERISA-exempt plan be the same as other
forms used for the employer's ERISA plans. The employer should make clear in its communication
that it does not "sponsor" the ERISA-exempt plan, and that its sole function is to facilitate payroll
deductions through the cafeteria plan to pay for the required premiums.
133. Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316,
325 (1997).
134. See supra Part II (discussing ERISA preemption generally); but cf William G. Schiffbauer,
ERISA Preempts Provisions of Massachusetts 'Play or Pay' Health Care Reform Law, 33 BNA
PENSION & BENEFITS REP. 2315, 2317 (2006), (stating "a number of courts have interpreted the use
of a cafeteria plan to be an employer 'endorsement').
135. Egelhoffv. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 147 (2001) (internal quotation and citation omitted).
136. Id. at 147 (quoting Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement, 519 U.S. at 325).
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Again, our starting point is that a primary purpose of ERISA was to
allow for nationally uniform administration of employee benefit plans.
As stated above, a premium-only cafeteria plan is not by itself an ERISA
plan. However, the FRS might be interpreted as requiring employers
who currently sponsor an ERISA health plan to adopt a specific funding
mechanism for the plan-a cafeteria plan. If characterized as a law that
mandates the funding mechanism for ERISA plans, the law would be
preempted as interfering with benefit plan administration, in clear
conflict with ERISA's goals. 137  Even where an employer offers an
ERISA plan, however, the FRS requirement to offer employees a
premium-only cafeteria plan need not involve the ERISA plan. That is,
the employer could leave the ERISA plan as is (with whatever funding
mechanism it currently uses) and offer employees a premium-only
cafeteria plan that allows employees to pay health insurance premiums
under a policy that does not qualify as an ERISA plan. 138 Similarly, for
employers that do not offer an ERISA plan, the cafeteria plan
requirement can be met by adopting such a plan in conjunction with
health insurance not governed by ERISA. 139 Because of this ability to
meet the cafeteria plan requirement without involving an ERISA plan,
nationally uniform benefit administration is not disrupted. As a result,
the FRS should not be preempted by ERISA.
VI. POTENTIAL LESSONS FROM MASSACHUSETTS
If this Article is correct, and both Massachusetts pay or play laws
survive preemption, what will they contribute to health care reform?
What lessons can other states take away from the Massachusetts
employer provisions? This section briefly examines these questions.
137. For example, if the law stated that any employer who sponsors a health plan must adopt a
cafeteria plan as the funding mechanism for the plan, the law would be clearly preempted as
mandating an employee benefit plan structure.
138. It is unlikely that an employer would make such a choice, as it would be easier for an
employer to simply offer the premium-only cafeteria plan in conjunction with its existing ERISA
plan. However, nothing in the FRS mandates this result. Nor is the result effectively forced by the
structure of the FRS. The choice of how to meet the FRS requirement is a real one.
139. For employers that qualify, the simplest action to take would be to adopt a cafeteria plan to
allow their employees to purchase any health insurance available through the Connector. The
Connector is a newly-created state agency that will provide a central clearinghouse for individuals
and small employers to shop for health insurance. See Mass. Plan, supra note 6, § 101 (defining and
describing the role of the Connector). Any individual, other than an individual who is employed by
an employer with more than fifty employees and is offered subsidized health insurance from such
employer, is eligible to purchase insurance through the Connector. Id. (defining "eligible
individuals"). The Connector specifically allows for the pre-tax payment of premiums through a
cafeteria plan. Id. § 32.
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A. The Impact of the Fair Share Contribution
As previously discussed, the FSC has a weak penalty for non-
compliance-a per-worker fee of no more than $295 per year. The
revenue resulting from the fee is expected to be a relatively modest $26
million. 140  This fee equals approximately 3% of the amount that
Massachusetts currently spends on uncompensated care. 141  While the
revenue gained from the FSC will have a modestly positive effect on
health care in the state, the more interesting issue is the effect the FSC
will have on an employer's decision to offer health care coverage to
employees.
Before discussing the FSC's impact on employer decision-making, it
is helpful to briefly review existing data on employer-provided health
insurance. As in the rest of the country, the majority of Massachusetts
residents are covered by employer-provided health insurance.1 42 Nearly
all large employers offer employee health insurance, but the propensity
to offer coverage corresponds to employer size. 143 As a result, to make
significant gains in employer-provided coverage, reform efforts must
target small employers.
The FSC applies to all but the very smallest employers, and therefore
picks up at least a good part of the "target" population. 4 4  However,
given the small size of the penalty associated with non-compliance, it is
unlikely that employers will change their behavior to avoid it (indeed,
this is part of the argument for avoiding ERISA preemption).
45
140. Massachusetts Proposes Minimum Standard for Employer-Based Care Under New Law,
BNA HEALTH CARE DAILY REP., July 5, 2006.
141. Figure calculated by author using annual uncompensated care expenses provided in the
editorial Beyond the Health Pool, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 15, 2006, at A18. The amount the state
spends on uncompensated care is expected to decrease as various health reforms, such as the
individual mandate, become effective. See PRESENTATION TO THE JOINT CAUCUS FOR HOUSE
MEMBERS, supra note 6, at 9 (noting that the SNC office developed a standard fee schedule to
reimburse uncompensated care).
142. THE OFFICE OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MASSACHUSETTS EMPLOYER HEALTH
INSURANCE SURVEY 2 (2005), http://www.mass.gov/Eeohhs2/docs/dhcfp/r/survey/er_2005_comp_
results.pdf [hereinafter MASS. EMPLOYER SURVEY] (finding that 63% of all residents are covered by
employer policies).
143. See id. at 5 (finding that 68% of employers with two to fifty employees offer health
insurance, while 97% of employers with fifty-one or more employees offer such coverage).
144. However, the very smallest employers are the least likely to offer health insurance
coverage. See id. at 5 (finding that 60% of employers with two to nine employees offered health
insurance coverage, compared with 88% of employers with ten to twenty-four employees).
145. Despite its small size, the fee may be sufficient to change employer behavior where the
difference between the value employees place on the benefit and the benefit employers expect to
receive from offering such coverage is less than $295.
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Nevertheless, even if the fee itself is insufficient to alter behavior, the
FSC may have signaling effects on employer decision-making.1
46
One possibility is that the law will signal to employers that they have
a responsibility to make a "fair and reasonable" contribution to employee
health coverage. 47 In that case, employers might change their behavior
even though the fee itself is not sufficient to force such a decision.
Another possibility (and one that is perhaps more likely) is that the
design of the FSC will signal to the employer that making a "fair and
reasonable" contribution to employee health coverage and paying $295
per employee per year are normative equivalents. If this is true, we
might actually see some employers drop coverage, as the $295 fee is in
almost all cases less expensive than making a "fair and reasonable"
contribution to employee health coverage. This outcome is unlikely for
employers who currently offer coverage, because such employers
presumably made a rational decision that it was beneficial to their
business to offer employees health coverage. However, this signaling
effect may cause new employers to be less likely to offer coverage in the
first place, all other things being equal. That is, they may receive the
signal that paying a $295 per employee fee is doing their "fair share"
with respect to employee health care.
It is simply too early to tell what signaling effect the FSC will have
on employer decision-making. Other states may be tempted to enact
weak pay or play laws similar to the FSC, because they can withstand
ERISA preemption. Because of the small revenue gains and potentially
negative signaling effects, such states may want to wait until data is
available from Massachusetts before proceeding.
B. The Impact of the Free Rider Surcharge
In its health care reform, Massachusetts attempted to address a
fundamental problem in health care: employees are only able to pay
health insurance premiums on a pre-tax basis if coverage is purchased
through their employer. To further complicate the situation, this
favorable tax treatment is only available if the employer sponsors a
cafeteria plan. 148 Massachusetts's FRS attempts to require all but the
146. For more on law's signaling effects, see, e.g., Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and
Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697 (1996); Richard H. Pildes, The Unintended Cultural
Consequences of Public Policy: A Comment on the Symposium, 89 MICH. L. REV. 936 (1991);
Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943 (1995).
147. See supra Part IV (discussing fair share contribution).
148. In 2005, only 49% of Massachusetts employers reported that they offered a cafeteria plan to
permit the pre-tax payment of health insurance premiums. MASS. EMPLOYER SURVEY, supra note
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smallest employers to adopt premium-only cafeteria plans so that, even if
the employer does not sponsor an ERISA health plan, the individual can
pay for health insurance on a pre-tax basis, cutting the cost of such
coverage by as much as 42%.
149
Assuming the FRS survives ERISA preemption, Massachusetts will
have succeeded in requiring employers to allow their employees to take
advantage of existing federal tax benefits that are available only for
employer-provided health insurance, and coverage rates should increase
as a result. 50  The effect on coverage will likely be greater than that
which results from the FSC, because of its direct impact on the
affordability of health insurance.
While the FRS cafeteria plan requirement is likely to increase health
insurance coverage rates, the costs it imposes on employers should not be
ignored. First, the employer must adopt a written cafeteria plan
document that complies with certain tax code requirements.' 5 ' The IRS
does not publish a standard or form cafeteria plan document that
employers can adopt. As a result, employers will have to pay a third
party to provide a cafeteria plan document. In addition, cafeteria plans
must comply with detailed "qualified change of status" rules. These
rules govern the circumstances under which a participant in a cafeteria
plan can change his or her annual elections under the plan, and what
types of mid-year changes are permissible.15 2  Policing these rules
requires an employer either to have an in-house expert who is familiar
with the regulations and can implement them, or to outsource the
142, at 20.
149. See supra Part V (discussing the cafeteria plan and the free rider surcharge). A 42%
savings would result for an individual in the top marginal tax bracket (35%), taking into account the
additional savings of avoiding payroll taxes (7.65%). A 2002 survey found that many small
employers are unaware of the tax advantages associated with employer-provided insurance. Paul
Fronstin et al., Issue Brief No. 253: Small Employers and Health Benefits: Findings From the 2002
Small Employer Health Benefits Survey, EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST., Jan. 2003, at 16-17, http://
www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/0103ib.pdf.
150. On its own, the cost savings may be insufficient to significantly affect the percentage of
individuals who elect employer-provided coverage. See Michael Chemew et al., The Demand for
Health Insurance Coverage by Low-Income Workers: Can Reduced Premiums Achieve Full
Coverage?, 32 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 453, 453 (1997), available at http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.
gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=1070205. In a study of low-income workers at small firms with no
other source of health insurance coverage, premium subsidies of 75% only increased participation
rates from 89% to 92.6%. Id. at 464. The authors note, "[a]lthough the overwhelming majority of
individuals participate in their employer's plan, there appears to be a subset who do not, even at
prices heavily distorted by the employer. For this group of workers, it is unlikely that a further
subsidy would alter participation dramatically." Id. This calculus might change with the addition of
the individual mandate, see infra Part IV.C.
151. See I.R.C. § 125 (2000).
152. See Treas. Reg. § 1.125-4 (2007) (discussing permitted election changes).
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administration of the cafeteria plan.' 53  Most large employers already
utilize cafeteria plans and therefore would not face any increased costs as
a result of the FRS.154 Small employers, however, may face significantly
increased costs. 155  Standard economic theory would predict that these
increased costs will be passed along to workers in the form of lower
wages. What is unknown at this point is whether the tax savings
associated with a cafeteria plan will more than offset any decrease in
wages. If so, the FRS should have a positive net impact on health care
coverage rates in Massachusetts.
Massachusetts could lower employer costs by providing a standard
premium-only cafeteria plan document that employers could adopt. 156 It
could also provide educational materials regarding permissible mid-year
election changes and other legal requirements related to cafeteria plans.
Other states that are contemplating a cafeteria plan requirement should
give serious consideration to providing a standard cafeteria plan
document, as well as educational materials, as doing so should lower
employer costs and protect employee wages.
C. Was Governor Romney Right?
When Governor Mitt Romney vetoed the employer provisions of the
Massachusetts health care reform legislation, he stated simply that such
provisions were not necessary to achieve health care reform.'57 The
implication is that the individual mandate and market reforms contained
in the legislation would be sufficient to increase coverage rates.
While employers currently provide health insurance to 63% of
Massachusetts's population,' 58  some employees who are offered
153. Alternatively, the employer could forbid any mid-year election changes. However, such a
restriction might have a negative effect on health insurance enrollment.
154. In 2005, 80% of Massachusetts employers with more than fifty employees provided for the
pre-tax payment of health insurance premiums through a cafeteria plan. MASS. EMPLOYER SURVEY,
supra note 142, at 21.
155. In 2005, 45% of Massachusetts employers with two to fifty employees sponsored a
cafeteria plan for the pre-tax payment of health insurance premiums. Id.
156. Employers would still need to be advised to seek independent legal counsel to review the
plan, unless the State also provided a legal opinion that the standard plan met all requirements under
§ 125.
157. Letter from Mitt Romney, Governor of Mass., to Mass. Senate and House of
Representatives (Apr. 12, 2006), available at http://www.ncsl.org/print/health/vetoletter.pdf.
158. MASS. EMPLOYER SURVEY, supra note 142, at 2. Of non-elderly residents with health
insurance, 83% receive coverage through an employer. MASS. Div. OF HEALTH CARE FIN. &
POLICY, HEALTH INSURANCE STATUS OF MASSACHUSETTS RESIDENTS 3 (5th ed. 2006) [hereinafter
INS. STATUS OF MASS. RESIDENTS].
2007] 1229
KANSAS LAW REVIEW
coverage from employers fail to elect such coverage, 159 and some
employers simply do not offer coverage. Employees who decline
employer-offered coverage most commonly cite cost as the primary
factor in their decision. 160 Small employers are the most likely to fail to
offer health insurance to their employees, and those employers similarly
cite affordability as a major factor in their decision to not offer a plan.'
61
Twenty-eight percent of small employers who do not offer health
insurance also cite a lack of employee demand for the benefit as a major
factor in the decision to not offer coverage.
62
Given this data, it is possible that the combination of an individual
coverage mandate and individual and small market reforms might, by
themselves, result in a greater number of employers health coverage and
a greater number of individuals accepting employer-offered coverage.
For one, we would expect an individual coverage mandate to increase
employee demand for health care coverage. Data suggest that this might
have at least some positive effect on employer-offer rates. Forty-five
percent of small employers surveyed reported that they would be either
much more likely or somewhat more likely to consider offering a health
plan if employees asked for it.' 63  In addition, small group market
reforms might lower costs for small businesses, which should also
increase the likelihood of employers offering coverage. 64  In turn, the
individual mandate should make employees more likely to enroll in
159. A survey of Massachusetts residents found that 78% of employees who are eligible for
employer coverage choose to enroll. MASS. EMPLOYER SURVEY, supra note 142, at 44.
160. Paul Fronstin, Issue Brief No. 287, Sources of Health Insurance and Characteristics of the
Uninsured: Analysis of the March 2005 Current Population Survey, EMP. BENEFITS RES. INST., Nov.
2005, at 1, 15, fig. 15 available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/EBRl IB_ 1-2005.pdf; see also INS.
STATUS OF MASS. RESIDENTS, supra note 158, at 12, 13 (reporting 2006 survey findings that 67% of
Massachusetts working uninsured adults reported that insurance being "too expensive" was why they
declined employer-offered coverage).
161. See Fronstin, supra note 149, at 1, 14 (stating that 63% of small employers surveyed
reported "the business cannot afford it" as a major factor in the decision to not offer a health plan);
see also MASS. EMPLOYER SURVEY, supra note 142, at 53 (reporting that in 2005, 85% of
Massachusetts employers cited "premiums too high" as a reason for not offering coverage).
162. Fronstin, supra note 149, at 14; see also MASS. EMPLOYER SURVEY, supra note 142, at 53
(reporting that in 2005, 40% of Massachusetts employers cited "employees prefer higher pay" as a
reason for not offering coverage).
163. Fronstin, supra note 149, at 15. Among small employers, 14% reported that they were
"much more likely" and 31% reported that they were "somewhat more likely" to consider offering a
health plan. Id.
164. Employers would need knowledge of market reforms in order for such reforms to influence
employer decisions to offer health coverage. At least one survey has suggested that small employers
are not generally aware of the small group market reforms that passed in the 1990s. Id. at 19.
1230 [Vol. 55
PAY OR PLAY LAWS
health coverage, as the cost of declining coverage is raised by the
penalties associated with the individual mandate.
65
Even without the FSC and FRS, the individual mandate and
individual and small group market reforms should increase demand for
employer coverage and thereby help to address a market failure. The
combination of these reforms will hopefully allow the market to function
more effectively than it has-making a market-based health care system
viable and lessening the need for, and attractiveness of, a single payor
system. This type of health care reform is likely to be more palatable to
a greater number of Americans, as it addresses problems within the
existing system, rather than moving to a government-based system.
VII. CONCLUSION
The broad preemption of state laws by ERISA means options to
involve employers in health care reform are limited, at best. In the end,
the comprehensive approach taken by Massachusetts may represent the
best way forward. Massachusetts has required individuals to purchase
health insurance if an affordable policy is available to them. It has
simultaneously tried to remove market impediments and encourage
employers to be actively involved in employee health coverage.
While we will not know for some time how successful
Massachusetts will be, we should be thankful that Massachusetts has
embarked on this bold health care experiment. They have enacted
reforms that include individuals, the state, employers, and the market.
For the first time, we will get to see whether weak pay or play laws
survive ERISA preemption and the extent to which such pay or play laws
impact employer-provided coverage. We should also be able to evaluate
whether an individual mandate can create enough employee demand so
that employers will be persuaded to provide health coverage to their
employees and greater numbers of employees will be persuaded to accept
such offers of coverage. If cafeteria plan requirements survive, we will
be able to gauge the extent to which the tax exemption for employer-
provided health care is critical in making health insurance affordable and
increasing coverage rates. Clarifying the contours of ERISA preemption
165. In 2007, an individual who fails to purchase health insurance when an affordable policy is
available to her will lose her personal tax exemption. Mass. Plan, supra note 6, § 12. The
exemption is currently a deduction of $3850 from taxable income. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 62,
§ 3B(b)(l)(A) (West Supp. 2006). Given Massachusetts's 5.3% individual income tax rate, the net
effect would be an approximate $200 annual penalty. In 2008 and thereafter, the penalty will be
equal to 50% of the cost of the applicable health insurance premium. Mass. Plan, supra note 6, § 13.
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as it applies to pay or play laws, and the data that becomes available as
Massachusetts implements its bold plan, will be of great significance in
structuring future health care reform efforts.
